Security model

Everything we do to protect your notes, and — just as important — everything we can't.

Goals

  1. Nobody but the person who knows the secret can read a vault: not us, not Apple, not someone with root access to the phone's files.
  2. A copied vault file is useless anywhere but on the original iPhone.
  3. Nothing in the app reveals how many vaults exist, and no file reveals what's in it. (Someone with file-system access can count the vault files — see the limits below.)
  4. Plaintext never touches disk, the cloud, the keyboard dictionary or the clipboard of another device.

Key hierarchy

Secret
4×4 pattern (≥5 dots), PIN (≥6 digits) or passphrase (≥8 chars, NFKC-normalized). Type-prefixed.
Stretched
PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA512(secret, 32-byte random salt, rounds) → 256 bit. Rounds calibrated per device to ~0.45 s, min. 210,000, max. 4,000,000.
Device secret
256 random bits, created at setup. Sealed with AES-256-GCM under HKDF-SHA256(ECDH(ephemeral, SE key)). The P-256 SE key is created inside the Secure Enclave with kSecAttrAccessibleWhenUnlockedThisDeviceOnly and privateKeyUsage; with the gate also biometryCurrentSet.
Vault ID
HKDF-SHA256(stretched, salt = device secret, info = "snv/vault-id/v1") → 128 bit → file name.
Vault key
HKDF-SHA256(stretched, salt = device secret, info = "snv/vault-key/v1") → AES-256 key.
Vault file
AES-256-GCM(vault key, length ‖ JSON ‖ zero padding to 4 KiB), associated data = vault ID. 12-byte random nonce per save.
Decoys
3 files of random bytes with the same shape, IDs derived from the device secret; one is rewritten on every save.
Recovery key
120 random bits shown once (24 Crockford-Base32 characters). Seals a copy of the device secret, so the vaults can be re-bound if your Face ID or Touch ID enrollment changes. It does not replace any secret.

Storage

  • All files use NSFileProtectionComplete (also set as the app's default via entitlement): unreadable while the iPhone is locked.
  • The folder is excluded from iCloud and computer backups.
  • The only plaintext file (header.json) contains the salt, the KDF rounds, the sealed device secret, the sealed recovery copy and whether the hardware gate is on. No vault list, no count, no hashes of secrets.
  • Deleting a file destroys its per-file Data Protection key, so deleted vaults are cryptographically erased.

At runtime

  • Decrypted notes and keys exist only in memory while a vault is open.
  • When the app leaves the screen, it saves, drops every key and returns to the lock screen. The App Switcher shows a cover.
  • The editor disables autocorrect, predictions, spell check and Writing Tools; third-party keyboards are blocked app-wide.
  • Copy and cut put text on a local-only pasteboard item that expires after 60 seconds.
  • Screen recording and mirroring are detected and the content is covered.
  • No network code, no analytics, no crash reporting SDK.

What an attacker gets

AttackerGetsCan decrypt?
Thief, phone lockedNothing (Data Protection)No
Copy of the files on another computerCiphertext + headerNo — the device secret needs this iPhone's Secure Enclave
Root on the phone, gate onCiphertext + headerNot without your face or finger — the Secure Enclave releases the device secret only after a live Face ID or Touch ID match. After one match, guesses are possible at ~0.45 s per try until the app leaves the screen, so a strong secret still matters.
Root on the phone, gate offCiphertext + header + use of the SE keyOnly by guessing on the device at ~0.45 s per try. A strong passphrase makes this infeasible; a short PIN does not.
Someone who knows your iPhone passcodeYour unlocked phoneNo — the app never uses the passcode
Us, AppleNothing — no server, no backupNo

What we can't protect against

  • A compromised phone while a vault is open. Malware with root can read the app's memory at that moment. The vault locks as soon as you leave the app.
  • Someone watching you. A camera that films your pattern defeats every lock. Use "Hide pattern trail" and a passphrase in public.
  • Forgetting your secret. There is no reset. That's what "nobody else can read it" means.
  • Losing the phone. There's no cloud copy. Keep critical secrets also on paper.
  • The number of vaults. There are always three decoy files plus one file per vault, so anyone who can list the app's files can work out how many vaults exist. The app shows no count, and the files don't reveal their content.
  • Repeated forensic imaging. Comparing several images over time can reveal which files are in use.
  • Bugs in iOS or the Secure Enclave. We build on Apple's hardware security; if that breaks, so does this.

Report a vulnerability

Write to us via the support page. We'll answer, fix and credit you.